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CHANGE OF VENUE IN ACTIONS INVOLVING
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS
By ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT, of the Denver Bar.
HE scene opens on a bright and cheery morning in No-
vember. We have dispatched a summons to one of the
far corners of the state and have filed a carefully pre-
pared complaint, unassailable in its perfectly stated cause of
action. We glow with the warm satisfaction of work well
done. Confidently we review our allegations and positive
are we that no "weasel" motions or demurrers can upset it.
Time passes and in the mail we receive a neat and pithy
warning that all is not well. It seems that the defendant,
residing in the remote county does not wish to have his at-
torney travel to the far-off big city every time he wishes to
argue a motion in the case. The defendant has embodied his
objection in the form of a motion for a change of venue. We
have gloomy visions of long, cold trips to the uttermost part
of the state, and almost feverishly we reach for our Code.
We find Section 29, ('35 C. S. A. Ch. 2, Sec. 29) which is
straightforward English:
"In all other cases the action shall be tried in the county
in which the defendants, or any of them, may reside at the
commencement of the action. . . . Actions upon contracts
may be tried in the county in which the contract was to be
performed. "
Where the action involves a contract which is specifi-
cally and definitely to be performed in a certain county, the
problem is simple: see for example, Grimes Co., Inc. vs. Nel-
son, 94 C. 487, 31 P. (2d) 488 (1934); Lamar Alfalfa
Milling Co. vs. Bishop, 80 C. 369, 250 P. 689 (1927);
Coulter vs. The Bank of Clear Creek, 18 C. A. 444, 72 P.
602 (1903).
Our case, however, involves a suit on a contract in
which there is no place specified for the defendant to perform.
We feel that we ought to look at a few cases so we reach
for Progressive Mutual Insurance Co. vs. Mihoover, 87 C.
64, 284 P. 1025 (1930), and find that the plaintiff may sue
where he resides even though defendant resides and was served
in another county. The court finds expressly that:
"Where the contract is silent as to the place of payment,
the debtor is obliged to seek the creditor in the county of his
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residence and at his usual place of business or abode, and make
payment to him there."
The net result was that the plaintiff tried the case in his
own county.
Well! We have solved that problem. But--our eye
falls on Kimberlin vs. Rutliff, 93 C. 99, 23 P. (2d) 583
(1933). Here the court finds that:
"The contract is silent as to the place of performance.
In that situation the code provision relative to the right of
trial in the county where the contract is to be performed is
not applicable. Such provision has reference to contracts
which by their terms are to be performed at a particular
place."
The result here is that the defendant is entitled to have
the case tried where he resides and was served.
With visions of numberless trips to the remote county,
we really settle down to careful search of all the cases. After
several hours, we find the score to be seven to six in favor of
the view announced in Kimberlin vs. Rutliff, 93 C. 99, 23 P.
(2d) 583 (1933). Incredulous, we re-read our cases and
finally desperately admit that there is a definitely and sharply
divided split of authority in Colorado.
The cases of People ex rel. Columbine Mercantile Co.
vs. District Court, 70 C. 540, 203 P. 268 (1922); Chutkow
vs. Wagman Realty and Insurance Company, 80 C. 11, 248
P. 1014 (1926); Progressive Mutual Insurance Co. vs. Mi-
hoover, 87 C. 64, 284 P. 1025 (1930); Gould vs. Mathes,
55 C. 384, 135 P. 780 (1913); Board of Commissioners of
Montezuma County vs. Board of Commissioners of San
Miguel County, 3 C. A. 137, 32 P. 346 (1893); and dictum
in Enyart vs. Orr, 78 C. 6, 238 P. 29 (1925); (we omit
Bean vs. Gregg, 7 C. 499, 4 P. 903 (1884) because the Code
of 1883 differs from its present form), will sustain us in our
now flagging hope of trying our case in our own county.
These cases hold that where a contract does not specifically fix
a place of performance, then the action may be tried where the
plaintiff resides. The decisions are not based squarely on that
ground in all the cases but the final result was that the
plaintiff kept the place of trial in the county where he brought
his action.
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Opposed to these cases and nearly always ignoring
them and their implications are the following: Maxwell-
Chamberlain Motor Co. vs. Piatt, 65 C. 140, 173 P. 867
(1918); People ex rel. Burton vs. District Court, 74 C. 121,
218 P. 1047 (1923); People ex ret. vs. District Court, 66 C.
330, 182 P. 7 (1919); Kimberlin vs. Rutliff, 93 C. 99, 23 P.
(2d) 583 (1933); Brewer vs. Gordon, 27 C. 111, 59 P.
404 (1899), and People ex rel. vs. County Court, 72 C. 395,
211 P. 102 (1922), which is weak on our point because it
is a note and hence covered specifically in another subdivision
of Section 29; and Smith vs. Post Printing & Publishing Co.,
17 C. A. 238, 68 P. 119 (1902), which is weak on our
point. These cases all hold that as a general proposition the
action must be tried where the defendant resides unless ,it
clearly appears that the contract is to be performed in some
other county. Again, these decisions are not all based squarely
upon this ground. For our purposes, however, they indicate
that the "city-shy" defendant was able to keep the place of
trial in his own county.
Confronted with this inexplicable conflict, we naturally
begin to go back to find some fundamental principle to be
used as a standard.
We gradually become aware that "performance" is a
word that embraces two distinct concepts. We realize that
every contract-involving as it does, at least two parties-
clearly contemplates two performances. The plaintiff is
suing because the defendant has not performed. In our class
of cases, the usual performance is the payment of money.
Viewed in this light, we are forced to concede .that some of
the cases favoring us have ignored the distinction: viz. Gould
vs. Mathes, 55 C. 384, 135 P. 780 (1913); Board of Com-
missioners of Montezuma County vs. Board of Commis-
sioners of San Miguel County, 3 C. A. 137, 32 P. 346
(1893). We are convinced of the validity of this concept by
Lamar Alfalfa Milling Co. vs. Bishop, 80 C. 369, 250 P. 689
(1927), which carefully distinguishes the two kinds of per-
formance involved in contracts. This theory is also set forth
in People ex rel. Burton vs. District Court, 74 C. 121, 218
P. 1047 (1923); People ex rel. vs. District Court, 66 C. 330,
182 P. 7 (1919); Brewer vs. Gordon, 27 C. 111, 59 P. 404
(1899), and Smith vs. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 17
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C. A. 238, 68 P. 119 (1902). We are thus forced to aban-
don the distinction between two kinds of "performance" as
an aid to keeping our case in Denver.
We recall vaguely that only one case has made any defi-
nite attempt to reconcile the conflict implicit in the two lines
of authority, or to distinguish the cases: Kimberlin vs. Rut-
tiff, 93 C. 99, 23 P. (2d) 583 (1933). The case itself is
contrary to our position because it held the venue must be
laid in the county where defendant resides and was served.
Avidly we seize on the reasoning requiring that the contract
itself must specify the place of performance because the venue
can be changed on that ground. We realize that in Gould vs.
Mathes, 55 C. 384, 135 P. 780 (1913) the contract was not
in writing and hence did not specify the place of performance
and yet the court refused to change the venue to the place of
defendant's residence. Board of Commissioners of Monte-
zuma County vs. Board of Commissioners of San Miguel
County, 3 C. A. 137, 32 P. 346 (1893) is to the same effect.
Also in People ex rel. Columbine Mercantile Co. vs. District
Court, 70 C. 540, 203 P. 268 (1922) the contract was set
out in the complaint in haec verba and in a real sense did not
definitely fix the place of performance; and yet the court did
not require the venue to be changed to where the defendant
resided and was served. We borrow the language of People
ex ret. vs. County Court, 72 C. 395, 211 P. 102 (1922):
"However, though the reason is wrong the decision was
right." We derive some consolation out of the fact that the
only case attempting to harmonize the conflict may be at-
tacked as not decisive because even it ignores several contrary
cases.
As a last resort we hopefully analyze the cases most
strongly in our favor, viz. People ex rel. Columbine Mercan-
tile Co. vs. District Court, 70 C. 540, 203 P. 268 (1922);
Chutkow vs. Wagman Realty and Insurance Company, 80
C. 11, 248 P. 1014 (1926); Progressive Mutual Insurance
Co. vs. Mihoover, 87 C. 64, 284 P. 1025 (1930) and the
dictum in Enyart vs. Orr, 78 C. 6, 238 P. 29 (1925), in the
hope that their original basis will help us reconcile the conflict.
These cases say that the debtor must seek his creditor and
make payment to him, and for that reason the creditor may
sue where he resides. The real basis for those decisions stems
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from statements in R. C. L. and C. J. to the effect that where
no place is expressed for performance of a contract to pay
money, the debtor must seek out the creditor and pay the
creditor where he resided. The text statements are not dis-
cussed under a topic involving venue or change of venue.
The Colorado decisions imply that if a debtor must seek his
creditor, and pay him, then there is an implied agreement in
the contract that it is to be performed where the creditor
resides. This reasoning seems to stretch "performance" to
cover a lot of ground in the light of the first sentence of Sec-
tion 29 of the Code and of the decisions that the action must
be tried where the defendant resides unless the contract itself
clearly fixes a place of performance elsewhere, see e. g. Lamar
Alfalfa Milling Co. vs. Bishop, 80 C. 369, 250 P. 689
(1927); Maxwell-Chamberlain Motor Co. vs. Piatt, 65 C.
140, 173 P. 867 (1918); People ex rel. Burton vs. District
Court, 74 C. 121, 218 P. 1047 (1923); People ex rel. vs.
District Court, 66 C. 330, 182 P. 7 (1919); Kimberlin vs.
Rutliff, 93 C. 99, 23 P. (2d) 583 (1933).
We finally become woefully conscious that "our mis-
tress" is capricious indeed. We still definitely wish to try our
case here but we are hopelessly unable to rationalize our posi-
tion as the better branch of two conflicting lines of authority.
We prepare to face the court with the strongest cases we have
and let the judge decide. As dusk falls we thoughtfully
wonder how many days away from the office those trips will
require.
A LAWYERS' ORCHESTRA
A unique institution in legal circles is the Lawyers' Club Orchestra
of the Philadelphia Bar (The Shingle, Philadelphia Bar Association,
December, 1938). It is composed entirely of members of the legal pro-
fession and started with eighteen men but now has a membership of
thirty-eight and is the only orchestra of its kind in the nation.
MISSING
Volume 10 containing the 12 issues of Dicta for 1933 has been
borrowed from the Editor and, as is usual in such cases, the latter has
received a large number of calls for articles which the index shows are
contained in that particular volume.
Please return it to the Editor's office.
